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Delivery of care to patients with highly communicable diseases balances the potential risk of 
transmission from the patient-to-healthcare personnel (HCP) with the risks to the patient of 
delayed or reduced access to needed interventions. The risk of transmission to HCP depends on 
many factors, described by the chain of transmission (Figure), and include the establishment of a 
reservoir (human, animal, inanimate environment), exit of the infectious agent from the reservoir 
and survival in the environment, with transmission by direct or indirect contact, droplet, airborne 
modes or combinations of these modes, and finally entry of the infectious agent via a portal of 
entry to a susceptible host at an inoculum sufficient to establish infection. Efforts to prevent 
transmission in healthcare settings—between patients, visitors, and HCP—are all aimed at 
interrupting the chain of transmission and include, in addition to correct and consistent use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) plus rapid institution of appropriate isolation precautions as 
indicated by the mode of transmission, multiple other interventions that minimize the risk of 
nosocomial transmission, often framed as part of the Hierarchy of Controls applied to HCP 
safety, but also with applications for reducing overall risk of transmission to patients and 
visitors.
1
In this issue of Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, DiLorenzo et al report on a survey 
of policies of Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) with respect to provision (planned or actual) of 
critical care interventions for patients with Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHF) such as Ebola Virus 
Disease (EVD).
2
 The authors distributed a 58-item survey to 82 ETCs between January 2020-
March 2020, and report on the responses of 17 institutions of which fewer than half had 
experience caring for patients with VHFs or persons under investigation (PUIs). The authors 
queried institutions on policies in nine critical care areas (renal replacement therapy, 
endotracheal intubation and mechanical ventilation, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, chest 
compressions, pharmacological cardioversion, electrical cardioversion, defibrillation, 
cricothyrorotomy, and code status) as well as to what extent staff safety, lack of appropriate 
technology, lack of clinical guidelines, clinical futility, and limitations of the environment of 
care, influenced policies regarding provision of care. A majority of respondents had policies with 
respect to renal replacement, endotracheal intubutation and mechanical ventilation, and chest 
compressions, although applications of each varied by patient level factors. For other 
interventions, fewer respondents reported having policies, and amongst those there was variation 
in types of patients (PUI vs confirmed VHF) to whom it would be offered. Among the factors 
influencing decision regarding offering care to either PUIs or confirmed VHF patients, staff 
safety and clinical futility were reported to impact decisions “somewhat” or “greatly” for a 
majority of respondents whereas lack of appropriate technology, guidelines, or physical 
limitations in the environment of care either did not limit care or limited minimally for the 
majority of respondents. 
The fact that healthcare personnel safety has such a prominent impact on decisions to offer 
particular types of care is not unique to VHFs, and has been a concern raised in the provision of 
care to patients infected with SARS-CoV-2, there are some prominent differences between the 
two pathogens that underly the potential risk of nosocomial acquisition to HCP. Specifically, the 
primary modes of transmission (EVD primarily contact and SARS-CoV-2 primarily droplet), and 
the ability of individuals to transmit infection while asymptomatic or presymptomatic (not 
considered likely with EVD, prominent with SARS-CoV-2) are key aspects that inform the 
infection prevention strategies (Table). 
The available data from VHFs and SARS-CoV-2, however, demonstrate that the major risks to 
HCP are from failure to identify patients at entrance to a healthcare facility as possibly infected 
and isolate them appropriately, failure to utilize personal protective equipment (PPE) correctly 
especially during donning and doffing, and inadequate PPE due to shortages. These same 
challenges have been present during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, HCP-to-HCP 
spread of SARS-CoV-2 has been linked to lapses in masking and distancing where masks are 
removed to eat or drink such as breakrooms and nursing stations and physical distancing is not 
maintained. Acquistion by HCP has then led in some cases to transmission to patients with 
propagation of transmission.
3
The primary intervention to reduce risk of nosocomial transmission relies on early identification 




, failures at this critical
juncture have resulted in exposures to HCP and transmission events. Failure to use appropriate 
PPE, closely tied to early identification of patients as PUIs and then use of the correct PPE. 
While self- and cross- contamination is a concern with SARS-CoV-2, and careful doffing and 
use of hand hygiene must be emphasized, transmission directly attributable to doffing failures 
has not been documented. One SARS-CoV-2 serological study failed to identify an association 
between positive serology and care of patients with COVID-19, however did note a strong 
association of living in a household with an individuals with suspected or confirmed SARS-
CoV-2 infection.
9
 Another serological study of HCP noted lower prevalence of SARS-CoV-2
antibodies among HCP who reported consistent use of a facemask when caring for patients.
10
 In
contrast, due to contact with blood and body fluids as the primary mode of transmission with 
EVD, self- and cross-contamination is a priority concern to the extent that extensive training in 
the use of PPE, careful selection of PPE components and order of doffing, close attention to the 
design of the physical space where doffing occurs is warranted, and the implementation of a 
Trained Observer is recommended by the CDC to ensure each HCP doffs correctly and that 
instances of possible contamination are identified during the process and mitigated.
11-15
 use of
dedicated HCP with who have trained and exercised in the use of PPE for Ebola is recommended 
both to the high-risk aspect of doffing PPE while avoiding self- and cross-contamination, as well 
as the fact that the PPE used for EVD and other viral hemorrhagic fevers is not used routinely in 
most healthcare settings. Adjunctive approaches, such as techniques to visualize contamination
16
and the use of ultraviolet disinfection of PPE
17
 have been assessed to reduce the risk to HCP. In
some settings with EVD, and world-wide with SARS-CoV-2 due to the large-scale global nature 
of the pandemic with resultant interruption of supply chain, PPE shortages have led to strategies 
that have included extended use, re-use of PPE following disinfection, and use of alternative PPE 
components that have not been certified, as well as lack of adequate PPE.
18
 HCP-to-HCP
transmission of VHFs has been reported.
19,20
 HCP-to-HCP of SARS-CoV-2 infection has been
well documented via droplet spread, in part, because it can be transmitted from asymptomatic, 
pre-symptomatic, and pauci-symptomatic individualsespecially in settings where masking is not 
present such as breakrooms.
21,22
 Transmission events are not restricted to HCP interactions in the
workplace are more likely to occur during external activities such as commuting while unmasked 
and other social activities where masking compliance between HCP may be reduced. 
DiLorenzo et al demonstrate that HCP safety in provision of critical care to EVD PUIs is 
informed by assessment of risk of potential for patient-to-HCP transmission. Similar concerns 
have underscored the COVID-19 pandemic, and highlight the importance of multi-faceted 
approaches to interrupting the chain of transmission. Differences between the two pathogens, 
however, specifically the primary modes of transmission and role of 
asymptomatic/presymptomatic transmission underscore differences observed in the overall risk 
of patient-to-HCP transmission. 
Figure. The Chain of Transmission. 
Figure Legend. Transmission from one individual to another requires completion of each step in 
the chain of transmission. Beginning with an infectious agent in a reservoir (e.g., human, animal, 
or inanimate object/surface), the infectious agent must exit the reservoir through portal of exit, 
survive in the environment, and be transmitted by contact, droplet, or airborne routes (or a 
combination thereof), enter as susceptible host through a portal of entry (e.g., eyes, nose, mouth, 
wound) at an inoculum sufficient to establish infection. 
Table. Comparison of Pathogens Primarily Transmitted by Contact with Body Fluids (e.g., Ebola virus) 
Versus Respiratory Droplets and Droplet Nuclei (e.g., SARS-CoV-2) 
Ebola virus SARS-CoV-2 
Microbiology 
Year identified 1976 2019 
Family Filaviridae Coronaviridae 
Genome RNA RNA 
Coat Enveloped Enveloped 
Epidemiology 
Prevalence Repeated outbreaks Pandemic 
Reservoir Bats Bats; research ongoing to identify 
additional potential reservoirs 
Intermediate host Primates and other animals None demonstrated 
Primary mode of 
transmission 
Direct Contact: Contact with 
infectious body fluids 
Respiratory droplets and short range 
droplet nuclei 
Other modes of 
transmission 
Indirect contact (i.e., contaminated 
surfaces, devices), sexual, blood 
transfusion 
Direct and indirect contact (i.e., 
contaminated surfaces, devices) 










Incubation period 6-12 days (range, 2-21) 2-14 days
Case-fatality rate ~50% (range, 25%-90%) ~15% among hospitalized patients 
Treatment Monoclonal antibody combination 








Laboratory biosafety level BSL-4 BSL-3 
Survival on surfaces Hours to a few day Hours to a few days 
Antiseptic 60%-90% alcohol based-product 60%-90% alcohol based-product 
Disinfectant EPA, emerging virus claim (List “N”) EPA, emerging virus claim (List “N”) 
Special handling of used 
linens, patient waste 
Yes No 
PPE worn by HCP (CDC) 1. Single-use (disposable) fluid-
resistant gown that extends to at
least mid-calf or single-use
(disposable) fluid-resistant
coveralls without integrated hood
2. Single-use (disposable) full face
shield
3. Single-use (disposable) facemask
4. Single-use (disposable) gloves
with extended cuffs. Two pairs of
gloves should be worn. At a
minimum, outer gloves should
have extended cuffs.
25
1. N95 respirator (or equivalent or
higher-level respirator) or
facemask (if a respirator is not
available)
2. Eye protection (i.e., goggles or a
face shield that covers the front
and sides of the face)
3. Single use (disposable), clean,
non-sterile gloves
4. Single use (disposable) isolation
gown or cloth gown.
26
Pre-exposure prophylaxis Vaccine None 
Post-exposure prophylaxis None approved for post-exposure 
prophylaxis 
None 
BSL, biosafety level; EPA, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; HCP, healthcare personnel; 
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